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"description": "Identifies the execution of known Windows utilities often abused to dump LSASS memory or the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit) in preparation for credential access.",
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"from": "now-9m",
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"index": [
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"endgame-*",
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"logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
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"logs-m365_defender.event-*",
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"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
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"logs-system.security*",
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"logs-windows.forwarded*",
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"logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
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"winlogbeat-*"
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],
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"language": "eql",
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"license": "Elastic License v2",
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"name": "Potential Credential Access via Windows Utilities",
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"note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating Potential Credential Access via Windows Utilities\n\nLocal Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) is a process in Microsoft Windows operating systems that is responsible for enforcing security policy on the system. It verifies users logging on to a Windows computer or server, handles password changes, and creates access tokens.\n\nThe `Ntds.dit` file is a database that stores Active Directory data, including information about user objects, groups, and group membership.\n\nThis rule looks for the execution of utilities that can extract credential data from the LSASS memory and Active Directory `Ntds.dit` file.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process, such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Examine the command line to identify what information was targeted.\n- Identify the target computer and its role in the IT environment.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Any activity that triggered the alert and is not inherently malicious must be monitored by the security team.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- If the host is a domain controller (DC):\n - Activate your incident response plan for total Active Directory compromise.\n - Review the privileges assigned to users that can access the DCs, to ensure that the least privilege principle is being followed and to reduce the attack surface.\n- Isolate the involved hosts to prevent further post-compromise behavior.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n",
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"query": "process where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.type == \"start\" and\n(\n (\n (?process.pe.original_file_name : \"procdump\" or process.name : \"procdump.exe\") and process.args : \"-ma\"\n ) or\n (\n process.name : \"ProcessDump.exe\" and not process.parent.executable regex~ \"\"\"C:\\\\Program Files( \\(x86\\))?\\\\Cisco Systems\\\\.*\"\"\"\n ) or\n (\n (?process.pe.original_file_name : \"WriteMiniDump.exe\" or process.name : \"WriteMiniDump.exe\") and\n not process.parent.executable regex~ \"\"\"C:\\\\Program Files( \\(x86\\))?\\\\Steam\\\\.*\"\"\"\n ) or\n (\n (?process.pe.original_file_name : \"RUNDLL32.EXE\" or process.name : \"RUNDLL32.exe\") and\n (process.args : \"MiniDump*\" or process.command_line : \"*comsvcs.dll*#24*\")\n ) or\n (\n (?process.pe.original_file_name : \"RdrLeakDiag.exe\" or process.name : \"RdrLeakDiag.exe\") and\n process.args : \"/fullmemdmp\"\n ) or\n (\n (?process.pe.original_file_name : \"SqlDumper.exe\" or process.name : \"SqlDumper.exe\") and\n process.args : \"0x01100*\") or\n (\n (?process.pe.original_file_name : \"TTTracer.exe\" or process.name : \"TTTracer.exe\") and\n process.args : \"-dumpFull\" and process.args : \"-attach\") or\n (\n (?process.pe.original_file_name : \"ntdsutil.exe\" or process.name : \"ntdsutil.exe\") and\n process.args : \"create*full*\") or\n (\n (?process.pe.original_file_name : \"diskshadow.exe\" or process.name : \"diskshadow.exe\") and process.args : \"/s\")\n)\n",
"description": "Windows services typically run as SYSTEM and can be used as a privilege escalation opportunity. Malware or penetration testers may run a shell as a service to gain SYSTEM permissions.",
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"from": "now-9m",
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"index": [
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"endgame-*",
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"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
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"logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
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"logs-m365_defender.event-*",
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"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
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"logs-system.security*",
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"logs-windows.forwarded*",
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"logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
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"winlogbeat-*"
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],
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"language": "eql",
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"license": "Elastic License v2",
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"name": "System Shells via Services",
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"note": "## Triage and analysis\n\n### Investigating System Shells via Services\n\nAttackers may configure existing services or create new ones to execute system shells to elevate their privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. They can also configure services to execute these shells with persistence payloads.\n\nThis rule looks for system shells being spawned by `services.exe`, which is compatible with the above behavior.\n\n> **Note**:\n> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.\n\n#### Possible investigation steps\n\n- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.\n- Identify how the service was created or modified. Look for registry changes events or Windows events related to service activities (for example, 4697 and/or 7045).\n - Examine the created and existent services, the executables or drivers referenced, and command line arguments for suspicious entries.\n - !{osquery{\"label\":\"Osquery - Retrieve All Services\",\"query\":\"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services\"}}\n - !{osquery{\"label\":\"Osquery - Retrieve Services Running on User Accounts\",\"query\":\"SELECT description, display_name, name, path, pid, service_type, start_type, status, user_account FROM services WHERE\\nNOT (user_account LIKE '%LocalSystem' OR user_account LIKE '%LocalService' OR user_account LIKE '%NetworkService' OR\\nuser_account == null)\\n\"}}\n - !{osquery{\"label\":\"Osquery - Retrieve Service Unsigned Executables with Virustotal Link\",\"query\":\"SELECT concat('https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/', sha1) AS VtLink, name, description, start_type, status, pid,\\nservices.path FROM services JOIN authenticode ON services.path = authenticode.path OR services.module_path =\\nauthenticode.path JOIN hash ON services.path = hash.path WHERE authenticode.result != 'trusted'\\n\"}}\n - Retrieve the referenced files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.\n- Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.\n- Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.\n- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.\n- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.\n- Check for commands executed under the spawned shell.\n\n### False positive analysis\n\n- This activity should not happen legitimately. The security team should address any potential benign true positive (B-TP), as this configuration can put the user and the domain at risk.\n\n### Response and remediation\n\n- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.\n- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.\n- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.\n- Delete the service or restore it to the original configuration.\n- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.\n- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.\n- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).\n",
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"query": "process where host.os.type == \"windows\" and event.type == \"start\" and\n process.parent.name : \"services.exe\" and\n process.name : (\"cmd.exe\", \"powershell.exe\", \"pwsh.exe\", \"powershell_ise.exe\") and\n\n /* Third party FP's */\n not process.args : \"NVDisplay.ContainerLocalSystem\"\n",
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